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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BUDGET LOAN AND 
FINANCE PLAN, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
BUDGET SYSTEM, INC., 
Plaintiff and R.espondent. 
Case No. 9224 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, 
In and For Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, District Judge 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an appeal from a Decree and Judgment 
from 'the Third Judicial District Court, with the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson presiding, made and 
entered on the 29th day of January, 1960 (R. 189, 
190), in which the Honorable Court enjoined, re-
strained and prohibited the defendant and appel-
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lant, Budget Loan and Finance Plan, from doing 
business under its present name Budget Loan and 
Finance Plan or any other name which incorpor-
ates the' word "Budget" within the Salt Lake City 
area. (The citation "R." followed by a number 
refers to pages of the Record on Appeal). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent's predecessors in interest, Mr. 
and Mrs. Hugh Barker, incorporated under the name 
of Budget Sys'tem, Inc. a small loan and finance 
business in the City and County of Salt Lake, in 
the year 1928 (R. 33, 184), on West Fourth South 
Street, and then in the year 192'9 they moved to 
Motor Avenue. In 1930 the Bank Commissioner 
of: the State of Utah issued it a small loan license. 
In the calendar year 1935, Budget System dis-
incorporated ( R. 33, 184). Immediately thereafter 
Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Barker engaged in the small 
loan and finance business under the assumed name 
of Budget System, the Bank Commissioner issuing 
a small 'loan license to them. An affidavit as re-
quired by statute of doing business under an as-
sumed name was filed in the office of the County 
Cle~k of Salt Lake County (R. 34, 185). 
The Barkers continued such small loan and 
finance business under the name of Budget System 
until the calendar year 1957, wl1en the partnership 
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of Barkers transferred its small loans only to a 
corporation incorporated in 1957 as Budget System, 
Inc., the responden't herein ( R. 34). From 1940 
to 1945 they did business at 763 South State Street. 
From 1945 until the present time 'they did business 
at 854 South Sta1te S'treet ( R. 33) . 
At the same time the Barkers filed under the 
na1ne of Budget System, in 1935 they also filed 
an affidavi't of doing business under an assumed 
name, as required by statute, under the name of 
Bu·dget Finance ( R. 34, 185). They commenced 
to do business under the name Budget Finance ( R. 
51). The partnership of the Barkers did bu'siness 
under the name Budget Finance from the period 
of 19'35 to 1957 (R. 52). In 195'7 the assets of the 
Budget Finance Company (a separa'te and distinct 
company from Budget System, Inc.) were so'ld to 
Barker & Company, and Mr. Barker and his wife 
as a partnership ceased to do business under 'the 
name of Budget Finance in the fall of 1957 (R. 55). 
In the calen·dar year of 195'7, Barkers sold all 
of their stock in Budget Systern, Inc. ( R. 185) . 
Budget Finance Plan of California in 1948, 
(parent company of this appellant) caused 'to be 
filed in the office of the Secretary of the State of 
Utah Articles of Incorporation of the Budget Loan 
and Finance Plan (R. 140, 141) .(Exhibit D-18). 
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Budget Loan and Finan·ce Plan was the Utah 
parent of the two operating subsidiaries in Utah 
( R. 141) , 'the two subsidiaries being Friendly Ser-
vice & Finance Company, which changed its name 
to Credit Finance Plan and Credit Industrial Loan 
Plan. These two corporations were engaged in the 
business of making srna'll and industrial loans, under 
the laws of Utah; Budget Loan and Finance Plan, 
a Utah corporation, owning all of the stock of these 
two corporations (R. 142). 
Financing in Utah was through the Budget 
Loan and Finance 'Plan ( R. 143) . 
The year 1958 was a year of substantial change 
for the parent corporation Budget Finance Plan 
(of California) (R. 144), which had over a sixty 
percent increase in the number of its offices. That 
is, it a;cquired 3'7 additional operating units (R. 
144). They \Vere located in California, Ohio, Massa-
chusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and 
Utah (R. 144). 
In 1958 they changed tl1e name of 20 units 
which the parent corporation operated 'to "Budget 
Finance Plan" from other names ( R. 145). The 
reason for such action was that because of the 
geographical expansion it became important to have 
a single name for purposes of advertising and pub-
licity (R. 145, 146). Bank lines and financing were 
·-I 
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n1ore successful in having the name ''Budget Finance 
Plan.'' 
This ·appellant is a wholly owned subsidi-
ary of Budget Finance Plan, a California corpora-
tioi1, which corporation is engaged in the finance 
business through some 93 branch offices or sub-
sidiary corporations in 16 states under that name 
or substantially similar names and has been in 
business for more than twenty years ( R. 18'5). 
In 1958, in line vvith fts policy, application 
was made to the Bank Comn1issioner of the State 
of Utah for a change of name from "Credit Finance" 
to "Budget Loan and Finance Plan", ('the name 
of its parent Utah company incorporated in 1948), 
its two offices being at 802 South State Street and 
1063 East 21st South, Salt Lake City, Utah (R. 
147). Mr. Seth· Young, the Sta:te Bank Commis-
sioner, granted the application and issued a license 
(Exhibit D-20); this license permi'tted this appel-
lant the righl to operate as a small loan company 
at 802 South State Street and 1063 East 21st South, 
under the name of Budget Loan and Finance P'lan. 
The aforementioned operations come under the 
direct supervision of the State Bank Commissioner 
by virtue of Section 7-10, Utah Code Annotated 
195'3, as amended ( R. 14 7) . 
The place of business of respondent was not 
occupied solely by respondent, but by American Co-op 
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Finance Co. (who owns Budget System) (R. 116). 
This company does a finance business. However, 
it had made an application for an industrial loan 
license ( no'twiths'tanding the fact that there is al-
ready a finance ·company operating under the super-
vision of the State Banking Department under the 
name of American Finance Company). The only 
difference in the names was the word "Co-op" (R. 
117). This application was pending at the time 
of trial. The American Buyers Insurance used two-
thirds of the building and Budget System and Am-
erican Co-op Finance Co. together used one-third 
(R. 68, 69). 
After the issuance of permission by the Bank 
Commissioner of the State of Utah to this appellant 
to do business under the name of Budget Loan and 
Finance Plan, mail and telepl1one calls directed to 
this appellant were received by the respondent (R. 
67, 82 and 83). However, telephone calls directed 
to this appellant and received by the responden't 
diminished after the appellant's name, Budget Loan 
and Finance Plan appeared in the telephone direc-
tory of August 1959 (R. 82, 8'3). 
There is no evidence that tl1e use of the word 
"Budget" in appellant's name caused any confusion 
or deception among the present or potential cus-
tomers of respondent. 
From a judgn1ent and decree forever enjoining_, 
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restraining and prol1ibiting this appellant from 
doing business under its present name of Budget 
Loan and Finance Plan or any other name which 
incorporates the name "Budget" within the Salt 
Lake City area, this appellant appeals to this Hon-
orable Court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT 
T'I-IE vVORD "BUDGET" IN THE NAME OF A'PPEL-
LANT SINCE NOVEMBER 1958 HAS CAUSED AND 
WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE CONFUSION AND DE-
CEPTION TO THE PUBLIC INTI-IE SALT LAKE CITY 
AREA AMONG PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CUS-
TOMERS THEREIN; THAT THE SIMILARITY OF SAID 
NAME IS A DECEPTIVE USE BY THE DEFENDANT, 
AN UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE, AND HAS AND WILL 
RESULT IN PR·OBABL'E DAMAGE T'O RESPONDENT'S 
BUSI~~ESS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT, ERRED IN FINDING THAT TH·E 
USE OF THE NATh1E "BUDGET LOAN AN'D FINANCE 
PLAN" HAS WORKED 'I'O THE INJURY. OF THE 
RESPONDENT IN AN UNDETERMINABLE AM'OUNT 
AND IF CONTINUED WILL RESULT IN FURTHER 
AND INCREASED PREJUDICE TO RESPONDE.NT'S 
BUSINESS. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED THE EXCLUSIVE 
RIGHT TO USE OF THE W·ORD "BUDGET" IN CON-
DUCTING ITS CREDIT AND LOAN BUSINESS IN 
THE SALT LAKE CITY AREA. 
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POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS DECREE 
IN FAVOR OF THE RESP·ONDENT HEREIN, BUDGET 
SYSTElVI, INC., AND AS AGAINST THIS APPELLANT, 
BUDGET LOAN AND FINANCE PLAN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS THAT 
THE WORD "BUDGET" IN THE NAME ·OF APPEL-
LANT SINCE NOVEMBER 1958 l-IAS CAUSED AND 
WILL CONTINUE TO CAUSE CONFUSION AND DE-
CEPTION TO THE PUBLIC IN THE SALT LAKE CITY 
AREA AMONG PRESENT AND POTENTIAL CUS-
TOMERS THEREIN; THAT THE SIMILARITY OF SAID 
NAME IS A DECEPTIVE USE BY THE DEFENDANT, 
AN UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE, AND HAS AND WILL 
RESULT IN PROBABLE DAMAGE TO RESP01'~DENT'S 
BUSINESS. 
POINT II. 
THE CO.URT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
USE OF THE NAME "BUDGET LOAN AND FINANCE 
PLAN" HAS WORI{ED TO THE IN JURY OF THE 
RESPiONDENT IN A,N UND·ETERMINABLE AMOUNT 
AND IF CONTINUED WILL RESULT IN FURTHER 
AND INCREASED PREJUDICE TO RESPONDENT'S 
B'USINESS. 
In equity cases the appeal ( Const. Utah, art. 
8, §9) may be on questions of both law and fact. 
Such is the appeal in this case. On such review the 
duty of this court requires an examination of all 
questions of 'law and all facts revealed by the record, 
an·d, after making such examination and due allow-
ance for the beltter opportunity afforded the trial 
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court to observe the demeanor of witnesses, and 
more advantageous position of determining their 
credibility and the weight to be given to the testi~ 
1nony submitted, this court, analogous to a . trial 
de novo on the record, will determine from a fair 
preponderance or greater weight of the evidence 
whether or not the findings of the trial court are 
supported therebye (Corey v. Roberts, 25 P. 2d 940·; 
Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 P. 526). 
The action of the respondenl is one for alleged 
unfair competition in that the respondent contends 
that this appellant has infringed upon respondent's 
right in its name "Budget System". The basis for 
such an action to enjoin unfair con1petition is essen-
tially one of fraud and deceit. (Ni1ns Unfair Com-
petition and Trade Marks, Fourth Edition, Sec'tion 
6, Pages 40 and 41, citing Reynolds & Reynolds vs. 
Norick (CA lOth 1940) 114 F. 2d 278~ 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record 
of any fraud or deceit on the part of this appellant. 
There is no evidence that the operation of this ap-
pellant under the name Budget Loan and Finance 
Plan has caused or will continue to cause confusion 
or deception in the Salt Lake Area among present 
or potential customers therein. 
In the review of the evidence it will be found 
that a11y confusion that occurred was nothing more 
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nor less than an inconvenience to the respondent 
from the customers and people in making inquiry 
for the respondent; that there is not one scintilla of 
evidence to the effect that any customer of t4is 
respondent was confused or deceived, or any person 
deceived by virtue of 'the appellant's operation. The 
on1ly evidence as to inconvenience or confusion is 
found in the record ( R. H7, 82, 83), which con-
sisted of telephone calls and misdirected mail in 
making inquiry for this appellant, and mail directed 
to this appellant and delivered to the respondent. 
Misdirected telephone calls dropped off after the 
new telephone directory was issu~ed ( R. 83) , the 
absence of Budget Loan and Finance Plan from the 
telephone directory causing in most part the incon-
venience to respondent. 
We submi't to some extent that confusion exists 
with all finance companies. 
We believe that it is highly significant, how-
ever, that this confusion consisted entirely of ap-
pellant's ·Customers who by mistake called or wrote 
to respondent, rather than respondent's customers 
conta·cting appellant. 
Mr. Barker's testimony, the predecessor of the 
respondent herein, did not consider the names "Bud-
get System" and "Budget Finance" to be so similar 
'that they were included one with the other. The 
10 
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uncontradicted evidence is that Mr. Barker thought 
to the contrary. He operated under the two names 
"Budget System" and "Budget Finance". He even 
went so far as to have the same filed of record in 
the office of the County Clerk of Salt Lake County 
as separate, distinct tradenames ( R. 34, 185), that 
is, Budget System and Budget Finance, and oper-
ated under these names (R. 52). Mr. Barker, under 
advice of counsel, filed these affidavits, that i's, 
two names ( R. 48) Budget System and Budget Fi-
nance. 
It appears to be fundamental in such actions 
that some element of "passing off" or "palming off" 
appel1lant's business as the business of the respon-
dent be involved. 
The essence of a cause of action for un-
fair competition is the palming off of the 
defendant's goods as those of the plaintiff, 
thus injuring the reputation or business of 
the plaintiff by causing the public to believe 
that the defendan't's goods are those of the 
plaintiff. Unless such a palming off is alleged 
and proved by the plaintiff, there can be no 
recovery for unfair competition. Kinnear-
W.eed Corporation vs. Humble Oil and Re-
fining Comp~any (USDC, Tex. 1956) 150 F. 
Supp. 14·3 at page 160. 
"Whatever the basis of 'the action, it is regarded 
as an embodiment in the law of fair play". (Nims, 
Section 6) . 
11 
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Having this general princip1e in mind, we refer 
briefly to the general concepts of law involved in 
such actions. 
THE DOCTRINE OF SECONDARY MEAN-
ING: 
The word which is common to both respondent's 
and appellant's names is the word ''budget''. This 
word is one of common usage and is not so fanciful 
as to qualify as a trade mark under the technical 
meaning af trade marks in the law. Indeed, the 
word "budget" is a word of common usage in every 
day language. The Court may take judicial notice 
of the fact that the word "budget" has a well rec-
ognize'd general meaning. (Graves v. Purcell, Mis-
souri, 85 S.W. 2d 543, 548, cited in 5 Words and 
Phrases 862). The same may be said for p'laintiff's 
entire name : "Budget System", which suggests a 
sys'tem by which income and expenditure for a de-
finite period are to be balanced. (Roov,e v. Stanley 
County, South Dakota, 219 N.W. 122, 123, cited in 
5 Words and Phrases 86.2) . 
Such a word may be 'said to be in the common 
domain or publici juris and is not subject to exclu-
sive appropriation. It has been said: 
. The doc'trine is so well settled by·a multi-
'tude of cases that it is not necessary to cite 
specific cases, that words in common use are 
regarded ,as common property, and may be 
12 
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used by others in combination with other de-
scriptive words, provided they are not so used 
in combination with other descriptive words, 
symbols, or designs as to render it probable 
that 'they would mislead persons possessing 
ordinary powers of perception. Fidelity Ap-
prais~al Co. vs. Federal Appraisal Co., (Cal. 
1933) 217 Cal. 307, 18 P. 2d 950 (emphasis 
added). 
Such a word is not entitled to protection unless 
it has acquired what is known as "secondary mean-
ing". 
In order to restrain a competitor from using a 
certain term in connection with his business, the 
plaintiff must show that he has appropriated the 
term to his exclusive use as an original technical 
trade mark (\vhich isn't 'the case in this action), 
or that the term possesses "a secondary meaning in 
the public mind" which designates the plaintiff's 
business and furnishes the basis for the charge of 
unfair competition. In the absence of proof of sec-
ondary meaning, no protection is obtainable for 
words in coramon usage or descriptive words used 
as the na1ne or part thereof, of a firm or corpora-
tion. (150 ALR, page 1101). The prerequisites for 
recovery for unfair competition include the estab-
lishment of a prior secondary meaning and of a 
reasonable likelihood of confusion resulting from 
defendant's appropriation of plaintiff's name and 
good wilL (Federal Glass Comp~any v. Loshin (CA 
2nd 1955) 224 F. 2d 100.) 
19 ~.) 
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"Secondary meaning" deals with the signifi-
cance, in law, of extensions of the meaning of word'S 
and symbols to new uses. (Nims, Section 36, page 
152). '~econdary meaning is association, nothing 
more. It exis'ts only in the minds of those who iden-
tify some article of commerce or some business house 
by some name or sign and associate the tv1o i11 thcb_:. 
minds"~ ( Nims, page 154). \Vith regard to this 
doct~in€ of secondary meaning, Judge Learned Hand 
has said: 
The single question, as I view it, in all 
these cases, is merely one of fact; What do the 
buyers understand by the word for whose use 
the parties are contending? If they under-
stand by it only the kind of goods sold, then, 
I 'take i't, it makes no difference \Vhatever 
\vhat efforts the plaintiff had made to get 
them to understand more * * *. After all 
presumptions and other procedural advan-
tages have been weighed, the owner mus't 
show that his mark means him, else he can-
no't prevent others from using it. Bayer Com-
pany vs. United Drug Company (USDC, NY 
1921) 272 F. 505, 509, 513. 
Mr. Nims, in his work on this subject, has said: 
The questions involved in these cases 
are: first, whether the name or device used 
by the plaintiff is used by him a11d under-
stood by the public to be used by him in a trade 
\sense, as identifying him or his goods· second 
when the pub'lic does give to the name' as used 
by the plaintiff, a 'trade ~eaning, 'whether 
the defendant has so used rt as to prevail on 
1·1 
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purcl1asers to buy defendant's goods, believ-
ing that they were getting the goods made by 
the plaintiff. Of course, if the defendant used 
direc't misrepresentation, the plaintiff's rem-
edy is plain. But when the proof shows that 
the defend,ant is ~[sing a term which is in gen-
er,al use ~as ,a part of the langt~age and VJholly 
or partially describes the goods in question, 
it must be (l condition precedent to plaintiff's 
sucoess that the term involved has come to 
possess ,a secondary ,and further meraning, viz. 
th,at the goods to which it refers, rare goods 
sold by the pl,aintiff. Unless this be proved the 
defendants are not in the wrong for they are 
rnerely using a name to which they have as 
much right as has the p'laintiff, and there is 
no room for a charge of fraud or unfairness. 
(Nims, page 157, emphasis ad'ded). 
Another text writer has said: 
* * * If plaintiff proves that the name or 
word has been so exclusively identified with 
his goods or business as 'to have acquired a 
secondary meaning, so as to indicate his goods 
or btlsiness, and his alone, he is entitled to 
relief against another's deceptive use of such 
terms, but if J~e fails in such proof, he is not 
entitled to relief * * * ( 63 C.J., page 394, 
quoted with approval in Academy of Motion 
P~icture Arts an,d Sciences vs. Benson (Cal. 
Sup Ct. 1940) 104 P. 2d 650, emphasis 
added). 
As sta'ted by another text writer: 
To constitute unfair competition in re-
spect to a trade name, two elements must be 
present. The name raust have acquired a sec-
ondary meaning or significance which iden'ti-
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fies the plaintiff, and the defen.dant ~ust haye 
unfairly used the name or a 'simulation of It, 
to 'the prejudice of the plaintiff's inter-
ests. * * * 
Where a plaintiff has failed to estab~ish 
a secondary meaning in a word incapable of 
being appropriated as a technica~ trade mar~, 
* * * such fact is fatal to an action of unfair 
competition predicated solely upon the use by 
the defendant of such word * * *. (Anno 150 
ALR, page 1076). 
Some examples of common or generic v1ords 
which have acquired a secondary meaning are: 
Ivory, when used in connection with soap; Standard, 
used in connection with petroleum products, etc. 
(Nims, pages 153, 154). 
BURDEN OF PROOF: 
The burden of proving the existence of second-
ary meaning is, of course, upon the party who asserts 
it. Thus, in the instant action the respondent, in 
seeking to enjoin the appellant in the use of the 
word ''budget'', has the burden of proving that the 
word "budget" has acquired a secondary meaning 
with regar'd to the respondent's business. (See Nims, 
Section '336, ·page 1057, 1058; 87 C.J.S. 552; 150 
ALR, page 1078). With regard to this burden of 
proof, it has been said: 
The burden of proof is a substantial one 
tha't is, 'one to be. emphaticall~ discharged; 
and must ~e sustained by a fair preponder-
ance of evidence or by substantial evidence 
16 
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sufficient to show that the use of the word by 
the defendant would resu'lt in passing off the 
later's goods as those of the plaintiff * * *. 
The burden of proof is particularly difficult 
to meet where the word in dispute is an ordi-
nary 1oord in the English l~anguage, properly 
~applic,able to the subject matter of the sale. 
* * * (150 ALR, page 1078 and ca'ses there 
cited. Emphasis added). 
Mr. Nims has said: 
In actions based on defendant's use of a 
descriptive word or dress of goods which, in 
a secondary sense, indicates plaintiff's busi-
ness or product, the burden is on the plaintiff 
to show such secondary meaning, also that 
defen'dan't is using them in their secondary, 
not their primary sense. ( N ims, Section 336, 
page 1057, 1058). 
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN DETERMIN-
ING WHETHER OR NOT SECONDARY MEAN-
ING EXISTS: 
In determining whe'ther a term or word has ac-
quired a secondary meaning, several factors are 
generally considered. As has been said: 
But it seems to be the practice of the 
courts in determining whether the p~aintiff's 
mark has acquired a secondary meaning, to 
consider ( 1 ) the length and manner of use of 
the name or mark in question, ( 2) the nature 
and extent of advertising and promotion of 
the mark, and ( 3) the efforts toward promot-
ing a conscious connection in the minds of 
the public of that name or mark with a parti-
17 
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cular product. (Time, Inc. vs. Life T.elevision 
Corporation (USDC, Minn. 1954) 123 F. 
Supp. 471 at page 474, citing 52 Am. Jur., 
Trade 1\Iarks, Trade Names and Trad~ Prac-
tices, Section 73, and cases collected In 150 
ALR 1067, 1082-1094). 
Accord: Oakford Co. vs. Kroger Com-
p.any (USDC, Ill., 1957) 157 F. Supp. 4'53. 
Large expenditures for advertising tend to 
establish the acquisition of the secondary meaning 
while conversely 'the lack of expenditure for adver-
tising 'tends to disprove the acquisitio11 of a secon-
dary meaning. (150 ALR, page 1090, 1091). The 
respondent spent only $300.00 for advertising for 
a fiscal year July 1958- June 30, 1959 (R. 99), 
whereas for example, National Finance, a competi-
tor, spent $300.00 a month for each branch office. 
However, the question of whether or not sec-
ondary meaning has been established is one of fact 
and not of princip1e, and consequently, no previous 
case can be a controlling authority on the question 
since each case must depend upon the facts applic-
able to that case alone. (150 ALR, page 1082). 
Although a trade name need not acquire a 'sec-
ondary meaning everywhere in order to be entitled 
to protection, the plaintiff must establish the exis-
tence of secondary meaning in more than a mere 
neighborhood. It has been held that although the 
exact territorial extent of a trade name is a question 
18 
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of fact, the narrowest limit that could reasonably 
be imposed today wou,ld be that of a state (Federal 
Glass Company vs. Loshin (CA 2nd 1H55) 224 F. 
2d 100). 
It should be noted that length of time of use 
alone is not enough to establish secondary meaning. 
Exclusiveness of use, extent of sales, and the extent 
and manner of advertising are also very important. 
(Nims, page 1039). 
The followin·g quotations from lVIr. Nim's work 
in the footnote a;t page 1040, 1041 give examples of 
cases wherein the evidence was not sufficient to 
prove secondary meaning. 
In the following cases the evidence was 
not sufficient to prove secondary meaning. 
Quaker State Oil Refining Co. vs. Pennsyl-
v,ani~a P.etrole~tm Products Co., 325 Pa 273, 
189 Atl 473 (1937) 27 TM Rep 146. 
"The only evidence from which it could 
inferred that the name of complainant's pro-
duct had acquired a secondary meaning, prior 
to 1919, is 'that its product has been marketed 
and had been nationally advertised for five 
years under this name. There is no other evi-
dence from which it could be inferred that 
the public associated 'Quaker State' or 'Quak-
er' with the complainant's product at tha't 
time. 'The mere adoption and use of words 
in advertisemen'ts, circulars and price lists and 
on signs and stationery give no exclusive right 
to their use.' DeLong Hook & Eye Co. v. Hump 
10 
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Hairpin Mfg. Co., 297 Ill. 359, 364, 130 NE 
765, 11 TM Rep 239." 
Erwyn Products, Inc. v. Lander Co., Inc., 
39 F. Supp. 49 (SD NY 1941), 49 PQ 452. 
Sales of about 2,000 pieces of the product 
bearing the claimed mark in a year and four 
rnonths, and that it had advertised in a maga-
zine and had window displays in about ten 
?rug stores did not establish secondary mean-
Ing. 
Sleight Metallic Ink Co., v. Marks, 52 F. 
(2d) 664 (ED Pa 1930). Three witnesses 
testified that the word "Metallic" v;as i'denti-
fied in their minds with plaintiff's ink; but 
during the time when this secondary meaning 
was claimed to have been created plaintiff's 
use was not exclusive, and this v1as one of 
the reasons for holding tha't the word had not 
acquired a secondary meaning. 
Sun V~alley Manufacturing Co. v. Sun 
Valley Togs, 39 F. Supp 502 (SD NY 1941), 
49 PQ 559. The elemen'ts required for second-
ary meaning were listed as (a) "length of 
use of such name". (b) "the nature and ex-
tent of popularizing and advertising such 
name". (c) "the efforts in pro1no'ting con-
sciousness of the public in connecting that 
name with a particular product." The period 
during which plaintiff had used the name 
"Sun Valley" 'vas too short, the c1aimed ex-
tensive advertising was inadequately proved, 
and there was insufficient evidence to estab-
lish confusion either of the trade or of the 
public. A preliminary injunction against de-
fendant's use of its corporate name was de-
nied. See also Actien,gesellscha.ft V eJ~einigete 
20 
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Ultrama-rine F'abriken v. Amberg, 102 F. 551 
(D NJ 1900); Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. North, 
148 Md 609 (1925), 130 Atl57, 43 ALR 206; 
Hiram Walker & Sons v. Penn-Maryland 
Corp., 79 F. (2d) 836, 839 (CCA 2, 1935), 28 
PQ 44; Steem-Electric Co. v. H erzfeld-Phillip-
son, 118 F. (2d) 122, 125 (CCA 7, 1940), 48 
PQ 92. 
SIMILARITY AND CONFUSION: 
Words in common use are common property and 
may be tlsed by others with other descriptive words, 
provided that the combination does not render it 
probab'le that persons possessing ordinary powers of 
perception will be misled. An organization may be 
denied the exclusive right in a name or word which 
is a common or generic or descriptive term, and the 
use of such word or name by another will not be 
actionable unless the later user is attempting to 
"palm off" his business as the former one. American 
Gold Star Mothers, I1tc. v. N,atior~Jal Gold Star Moth-
ers, Inc., 191 F. '2d 488, 27 ALR 2d 948; Beverly 
Hills Hotel Corp. v. Hilton Hote~s Corp. (Calif. Dist. 
Ct. of App. 1955) 285 P. 2d 1012. The test is whether 
or not the names are so similar as to render it prob-
able that persons possessing ordinary powers of 
perception will be mislead. 
In the instant case respondent contends that 
appellant's name "Budget Loan and Finance Plan" 
is so decep'tively 'similar to respondent's name "Bud-
ge't System" as to warrant injunctive relief. 
21 
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In the case of Feder~al Securities Company v. 
Feder.al Securities Corporation (Oregon Sup. Ct. 
1929) 129 Ore. 375, 276 Pac. 1100, 66 ALR 934, 
plaintiff sued to enjoin defendant's use of its cor-
porate name, con'tending that the similarity entitled 
plaintiff to such relief. The court refused to enjoin, 
saying that one corporation cannot restrain another 
from using in its corporate title a name or word to 
which all o'thers have a common right. The court 
further stated that a greater degree of similarity in 
names of corporations will be tolerated where they 
are geographical or descriptive than v1here the first 
corporation's 11ame is fanciful and arbitrary. There 
was evidence of misdirected mail and telephone cal1s. 
In this regard the court said : 
The evidence in'dicates that, after the 
defendant opened its office in Portland, some 
mail matter, 'telegrams, and packages intended 
for the one were delivered to the other. In-
stances occurred where telephone calls were 
misdirected, and upon two occasions the tele-
graph companies became confused in making 
charges for their services. We are satisfied, 
however, that much of this sort of confusion 
will disappear as the postal department, tele-
graph companies, and deliverymen become ac-
quainted with the two companies; such was 
the experience in Umpqua Broccoli Exch. v. 
Um-Qua Val:ley Broccoli G1·ozeers, 117 Or. 
678, 245 Pac. 324. The evidence is clear that 
'the d~f~nda:nt has never 'taken advantage of 
the Similarity of names, and has instructed 
its employees to make no misrepresentations 
22 
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concer11ing its identity; in fact, we seem to be 
warranted in concluding tha't the defendant is 
possessed of no desire to appear as the plain-
tiff. ( 66 ALR at page 938, 939). 
The court further stated: 
* * * p1,·imarily it is not the name which 
is protected, btttt the business; the l,atter is 
guarded ,ag~ainst injury through ,a fraudulent 
traffic in its name by later comers. The busi-
ness will be protected whether conducted in 
the name of an individual or 'that of a corpor-
a'tion; whether the name is fanciful or not. 
But, to just-ify relief, the curc?J~mst,ances must 
be such that it ~appBars tl'bat the business will 
suffer from ,a ~deceptive use of its name, or 
tlvat by re,ason of a similar ~act of unfair com-
petition, the public will be impose~d upon. ( 66 
ALR at page 945, emphasis added). 
* * * When it has been found tha't there 
is a similarity of names, a court does not cease 
its inquiries and at once grant relief, bu't pro-
ceeds to ascertain whether the other facts are 
such that deception and injury are likely. ( 66 
ALR at page 94'7). 
And Nims has said: 
The courts allow for the fact that in the 
ordinary course of buBiness a certain amount 
of error and confusion will occur ·and no mat-
ter how great the difference in names, marks 
and packages. ( Nims, page 104 7). 
In the case of Beverly Hills Hotel Corp. v. 
Hilton Hotels Corp. (Calif. Dist. Ct. of App. 1955) 
285 P. 2d 1012, plaintiff sued to restrain the use of 
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a name. In denying the injunction the court held 
that the names "The Beverly Hrlls. Hotel" and "The 
Beverly Hilton" were not so similar as to warrant 
the relief sought. There was evidence that deliveries 
w~re misdircted and that the newspapers had con-
fused the nameso 
In the case of FTas,er v. Singer, (Georgia 1954) 
83 S.E. 2d 599, the court held 'that there was not 
sufficient similar1ty between "Singer's Casual 
Shop" and "C~asual Corner" and refused to enjoin; 
in Applebaum v. Senior (Calif. f957) 316 P. 2d 
410, the eourt denied re'lief where the names were 
"Junior's Boot Shon" and "Senior's Junior Boot 
.a: 
Shop"; and in V.ermont Motor Company, Inc. v. 
Monk (Ver1nont 1950) 116 Vt. 309, 75 A 2d 671, 
the court refused to protect "Vermont Motor Com-
pany" against "Vermont Motor Sales". 
The rule is well stated in Middletowr;L Trust Co. 
v. Middletown Natior~Jal Bank, (Conn.) 110 Conn. 
13, 20; 14 7 A 22, 25, as follows: 
No inflexible rule can be laid down as to 
\vhat use of names will constitute unfair com-
peti'tion; this is a question of fact. The ques-
tion to be determined is whether or not, as a 
matter of fact, the name is such as to cause 
confusion in the public mind as between the 
plaintiff's business and that of the defendant, 
resulting in injury to the pl~aintiff. The test 
. is whether the public is likely to be deceived. 
* * * It is not sufficien't that son1e person 
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may possibly be misled, but the similarity 
must be such that any person, with reason-
ab'le care and observation as the public gener-
ally are capable of using and may be expected 
to exercise, would be likely to mistake one for 
the other. 
The Vermont Motor Company case, supra, is 
substantially similar to the instant case. There the 
plaintiff was incorporated in 1932 and had engaged 
in the business of selling and servicing motor ve-
hicles and parts under the name Vermont Motor 
Company. Although its activity had been limited 
in later years it intended to continue in the busi-
ness. It maintained a place of business, a telephone 
listing and carried on a small amount of advertis-
ing. Defendants were partners and began business 
in 1948 u~nder the name Vermont Mo'tor Sales in 
the same city as <plaintiff. Defendants did a sub-
stantial business selling approximately 400 vehicles 
per year, and had a Studebaker franchise. They ad-
vertised extensively. The plaintiff claimed a pre-
ferential right to the words "Vermont Motor". There 
was some evidence of confusion and inconvenience 
caused by misdirection of mail. In denying the re-
quested injunctive relief the court stressed the fact 
that plaintiff had failed to prove any financial 
damage attributable to defendant's use of the name. 
The court quoted witl1 approval the passage from 
the Middletown Trust Case, set out supra, and also 
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from the Federal s,ecurities case, supra. With regard 
to the inconvenience of misdirected mail tl1e court 
said: 
The plaintiff relies on the finding that 
it has been caused son1e inconvenience by the 
misdelivery of mail in support of its claim 
that the similarity of names causes confusion. 
it cites three cases in support of this conten-
tion.. A reading of these cases discloses either 
that trouble with mail delivery was only one of 
several reasons for the finding of such con-
fusion as would justify injunctive relief or 
that the ca'ses were decided as tl1ey were on 
other groundso We hav.e found no cas,e where 
such relief was gr~anted for this reason alone. 
For cases denying such relief for this reason 
see Ann. 66 ALR at page 972. 
* * * Moreover, i't does not seem that 
mere inconvenience without consequent loss is 
sufficient to warrant injunctive interference. 
( 75 A 2d at page 673, emphasis added). 
There are many examples of substantial simi-
larity of names in the immediate Salt Lake metro-
politan area in 'the finance business., as well as other 
businesses, such as American Finance Company, 
American Co-op Finance Company, American Sav-
ings and Loan Association, Continental Bank and 
Trust Company, Continental Credit Corporation 
(Exhibit 14), Continental Loans, Inc., General 
Credit Company, General Finance Company, Utah 
Credi't Company and Utah Finance Company. 
26 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
RESPONDENT HAS ACQUIRED TI-IE EXCLUSIVE 
RIGHT TO USE OF THE WORD "BUDGET" IN CON-
DUCTING ITS CREDIT AND LOAN BUSINESS IN 
TI-IE SALT LAKE CITY AREA. 
Our argumen't under Point I and II also ap-
plies to Point III. However, in addition thereto we 
would like to call the Court's attention to the fact 
that 'the respondent did not acquire the exclusive 
use of the word "Budg~t". In 19H5 the Barkers, the 
predecessors in interest of this respondent, filed an 
affidavit of doing business under an assumed name 
of Budget Finance ( R. 34, 185). That they did 
btlsiness under the name of Budget Finance until 
1957 (R. 51, 52). In the fall of 1957 'they ceased 
to do business under the name of Budg~t Finance 
(R. 55). 
It is the position of this appellant that the pre-
decessor in interest of this respondent established 
a distinct and separate property right in the name 
"Budget Finance" and that he abandoned the same 
in 1957. Upon abandon1nent the same was subject 
to apropriation or use by 'this appellant. At the 
time Mr. Barker reincorporated in 195'7, he and 
his wife transferred only their small loans to a cor-
poration incorporated as Budget System, Inc., which 
is the respondent herein (R. 34). He discontinued 
doing business as Budget Finance, selling all of his 
27 
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stock to Barker & Company (R. 55). There is no 
question but what the n'ame "Budget Finance" was 
abandoned. 
We pose the question, suppose that Mr. Barker 
had eontinued to use the name "Budget Finance" 
after 'the reincorporation. Cou'ld the respondent cor-
p-oration enjoin the use by Mr. Barker of the name 
"Budget Finance"? Without any question, of course, 
he could not. 
So we pose the ques1tion, if they cou1d not enjoin 
Mr. Barker from continuing the use of it, why 
could not 'this appellant adopt this name after it 
had been abandoned? It had never been acquired by 
the respondent by use, conduct, or by purchase. 
Trade name rights, like other rights based upon 
user, may be lost by abandonment, non-user, laches, 
or acquiescence. (See Nims, 4th Edition, Section 
408). Where it plainly appears that the right to use 
a trade name has been abandoned, the courts will 
not restrain the use of such name by another per-
son. See 48 ALR 1264 and cases. Rights and respect 
of a 'trademark or trade name n1ay be terminated 
by abandonment. See 52 Am. J ur. 524. 
While the rule is to the effect that intention 
governs abandonment, such intention need not be 
directly shown. It is not necessary to produce dec-
lara'tions of an intent to abandon; such intent may 
be inferred from the circu1nstances. (Nims, Section 
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408). Where a business has been discontinued the 
trademarks used in connection with it are aban-
doned since they cannot exist apart from the busi-
ness. (Nims, Section 408, Page 1278, citin'g cases). 
There can be no question that the name "Budget 
Finance" was a clearly established business enter-
prise, separate and distinct from that of "Budget 
System". That under the law this defendant, or any 
other corporation or individual, had the right to 
adopt such name. There is no question that Barker 
could have continued to use it, and certainly this 
appellant, in view of the absolute abandonment, 
could adopt the same. 
P'OTNT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS D'ECREE 
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT HEREIN, BUDGET 
SYSTEM, INC., AND AS AGAINST THIS APPELLANT, 
BUDGET LOAN AND FINANCE PLAN. 
Our arguments in Point I, Point II, and Point 
III are also material and pertinent to Point IV. 
It is the position of this appellant 'that a cor-
porate name which includes words of generic or 
common use will not receive protection unless the 
name has acquired a secondary meaning. All of the 
cases support tl1is rule. The respondent h'as failed 
in his proof, of whicl1 he has the burden, to estab-
lish this fact. 
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The law is clear, in our opinion, that to enjoin 
unfair competition it is necessary to show fraud 
and deceit CNims Unfair Competition and Trade 
Marks, Fourth Edition, Section 6, Pages 40 and 
41, citing R.eynolds & R.eynolds vs. Norick (CA lOth 
1940) 114 F. 2d 278). This it has not done. 
The only confusion tha't existed is that referred 
to in the other Points as to misdirected telephone 
calls and mail, which actually and in fact only 
amounted to inconvenience to the respondent. Such 
inconvenience canno't and does not amount to fraud 
or deceit, nor does it amount to deception to respon-
dent's customers, potential or present. It is very 
significant that the misdirected telephone cal1s and 
mail consisted entirely of appellant's customers. No 
evidence was introduced that respondent's customers 
were misled into thinking that appellant was in fact 
respondent. In other words, there was no evidence 
to the effect that any customer of respondent was 
deceived or confused by virtue of appella11t's opera-
tion in the Salt Lake Area. 
We think it is very important and a major 
factor which should be considered by this Honor-
able Court; that is, the issuance of a license by the 
Bank Commissioner of the State of Utah to this 
appellant to operate a smal1 loan corporation under 
the laws of the State of Utah under the name of 
"Budget Loan and Finance Plan". As this Honor-
so 
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able Court well knows, one cannot operate a savings 
and loan company, a bank, a small loan company, 
or an industrial loan company except by the issu-
ance of a charter or license therefore by the Bank 
Commissioner of the Sta'te of Utah. It is well l{nown 
that before issuing such a license or charter, a Bank 
Commissioner either holds a hearing or makes an 
extensive investigation as to location, name, charac-
ter, financial responsibility, and other factors be-
fore he will issue a license or charter. In this case 
we must presume tha;t the Bank Commissioner made 
such an investigation before issuing a license to do 
business under the name of Budget Loan and Fi-
nance Plan. The Bank Commissioner, of course, was 
aware of the small loan license issued to Budget 
System, Inc. 
It is fundamental that courts are reluctant to 
substitute their judgment for that of an adminis-
trative body where there is no evidence to show that 
there has been an abuse of discretion by that ad-
ministrative agency. 
Certainly there has been no such showing here 
and we must conclude that the Bank Commissioner, 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion we respectfurly submit: 
1. That the word 'budget" in respondent's 
name is generic and respondent cannot claim the 
exclusive use or possession of that word without 
showing that it has acquired a secondary meaning. 
This it has no't done. 
2. That the name of the appellant is not so 
similar to respondent's name as to constitute an 
unlawful and unfair use; and indeed that the degree 
of similarity between respondent's and appellant's 
names is no greater than the similarity between the 
names of respondent's parent corporation and its 
competitors in the area. 
3. Thal the only confusion shown in the record 
is that of appellant's customers going to respondent, 
largely during the time prior to the listing of ap-
pellant's name in the telephone book. 
4. That the evidence is conclusive that there 
has been an absolute abandonment; that the name 
"Budget Finance" was a name which had been used 
and had been treated as a distinct property right by 
Barkers. There is no doubt that because of its aban-
donment and the fact that it was a separate pro-
perty right, that other people had the right to adopt 
it. Barker himself conclusively proved by his testi-
mony that he considered that there was a distinctive 
32 
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difference, by filing the affidavit referred to and 
using the n'ame "Budget Finance". 
5. We feel that the action of the Bank Com-
missioner in permitting the use of 'the name "Budget 
Loan and Finance P1an" is significant and should 
be given great weigh't. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS H. CALLISTER and 
NATHAN J. FULLMER 
Couns.el jor App.ellant 
619 Continental ·Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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